


































In recent years, the shape of the discourse concerning the structure and subsistence of 
fundamental properties has taken on new dimensions with respect to their synoptic 
framing of special science entities. Specifically, challenges to the completeness of physics 
stemming from evidence of non-linear emergence in the special sciences  have attenuated 
the traditional reliance of accounts of fundamental properties as being derived from a base 
which takes for granted the fundamentality of physically compatible properties. As such, in 
the course of this paper, preliminary assumptions from which an account of a monistically 
dispositional picture of fundamental properties compatible with the non-linear emergent 
properties evidenced by special science entities might be developed will be explored such 
that both the dispositional monist program might be salvaged as well a potential basis 
developed from which non-linear, strongly metaphysically emergent dynamics might be 
synoptically provided for. 
 
Introduction  
The question of the relationship of objects to those various facts which characterize 
the structure of their properties has stood as among the most persistent, and in no small 
sense persistently vexing, problems with which metaphysicians have grappled since the 
birth of the discipline as a formal area of concern. With respect to the dispositional monist 
conception of fundamental properties, while articulating a largely consistent general 
program, what exact picture of the structure and ground of dispositions themselves would 
best account for their putative role in synoptically accounting for natural properties is a 
itself a vibrantly contested subject of debate. Further in this vein, the question of how both 
the ground and profile of fundamental properties might best be provided for within a 
monistically dispositional framework in light of the cutting edge of research within the 
special sciences,  specifically in regard to developments  in the mid and higher level 
sciences, has added a further, deeply challenging dimension to this discourse.  
Most acutely, the debate over what the proper basis of a monistically dispositional 
conception of fundamental properties would consist in has largely turned on what the 
proper relationship might be of dispositions to the laws of nature, and as to whether or not 
in fact the the laws of nature have any role at all in accounting for natural properties, with 
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this question standing in further relation to the role of causation in exhausting the 
ontological profile of dispositions. More specifically, the degree to which causation depends 
upon any form of nomological foundation, and conversely whether or not in fact 
dispositions themselves might provide the foundation of the laws of nature, has occupied 
much of the traditional heart of the debate over the essence of the dispositionalist program. 
To this end, the tenability of tethering the profile of dispositions to causation has come 
under increasing scrutiny in the face of new, ever accumulating evidence regarding the 
presence of macroscopic ordering relations within nature which exceed the scope of 
strictly causal relations. Most particularly, evidence of non-linear emergence in the 
relationship of the macroscopic properties of special science entities to the properties of 
their composing constituents has challenged the viability of attributing fundamentality to 
strictly causal relations. This may taken as the case given that, in structuring the behavior 
of their composing constituents, such macroscopic properties exert a determining effect 
upon said constituent particles evidencing a degree of relational complexity which 
precludes the invocation of strictly efficient causal relations in accounting for the structure 
and ground of fundamental properties. In view of these considerations, it is this question 
that forms the core concern of this paper, namely whether or not a dispositonal picture of 
properties can be reconciled with the non-funamentality of causal relations in view of the 
structural complexity at play in the relations obtaining between the properties of 
macroscopic systems and those of their microscopic composing constituents. 
To this end, it is in fact explicitly in view of these considerations that I will advocate 
the indispensability of a monistically dispositional framework in providing an adequate 
account of nature’s fundamental properties.  Specifically, given that in acceding to an 
understanding of nature’s structure which posits the fundamentality of structurally 
macroscopic determining relations over and above any synoptic reliance upon the nature 
of fundamental properties as deriving their ground in any sense intrinsically, any deference 
toward properties as obtaining without deference to their relations to other properties 
becomes therefore moot. As such, in service of this aim, I will advocate in favor of a 
monistically disposional picture of properties grounded by an account of the laws of nature 
which holds LON to be constituted as a matter of restricted metaphysical necessity in the 
form of structural entailments obtaining in virtue of nature’s putatively machretic 
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constitution. More specifically, this employment of the term machretic draws upon the 
concept developed in various domains of the special sciences concerned with the non-
linear emergent properties of complex macroscopic processes. Most fundamentally, the 
concept of machretic conditioning accounts for said properties by positing the relationship 
of macroscopic processes to their composing constituents to consist of non-causal, non-
compositional, role shaping determining relations which downwardly condition the 
collective behaviors of a given system’s constituent particles. (Gillett, 2016)  As such, in 
taking on board this view, any conception of the ground of fundamental properties must be 
taken as essentially subsistent within a mutually interdependent, macroscopic structural 
ground. 
In meeting the previously stated aims, in the course of this paper I will look to 
develop preliminary assumptions which might underpin a monistically dispositional 
framework compatible with the picture of nature’s nomological constitution advanced by 
the concept of machretic determination. In so doing,  I will first give a cursory overview and 
critique of two standard-bearing iterations of dispostional monism which exemplify the 
shortcomings of varieties of this program which accede respectively to the contingency of 
the laws of nature, in the case of Stephen Mumford’s work, and the identity and ground of 
fundamental properties as being exhausted by their causal profiles as advanced by 
Alexander Bird. Subsequent to these critiques, I will articulate the fundamentals  of 
machretic determination’s alternative conception of nature’s nomological structure and its 
suitability in rectifying the synoptic inadequacies of the preceding frameworks’ 
conceptions of LON. Following from this, I will look to spell-out the rudimentary 
preliminary structure of machretically grounded monistically dispositional properties in 
terms of their relationship to the laws of nature and the corresponding nature of the 
relations through which their manifestation would be derived. Further in this aim, I will 
explore cases applying  this framework to special science entities such that the synoptic 
potential of such a framework might be satisfactorily illustrated. 
 
Profile of Nomic Contingency 
 Perhaps the key area of contention between the respective flavors of dispositional 
monism concerns the precise relationship of dispositions and the laws of nature. Certainly 
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among the more controversial of the conceits staked in this arena is the claim that the laws 
of nature are themselves not only non-fundamental, but that whatever ontological role they 
might have is satisfied and exhausted by the causal role of disposition such that the 
synoptic necessity of incorporating the laws of nature in our description of the world is 
therefore moot. To this end, Stephen Mumford, arguably the principal champion of this 
particular brand of dispositional monism, mounts his central challenge to the utility of the 
laws of nature in maintaining that, not only are the laws of nature non-essential in 
accounting for the structure of nature, the very notion of natural laws is itself, if one is to 
maintain an anti-humean, dispositional essentialist metaphysics, is untenable given that in 
order for a law to have a governing role with respect to its attendant properties, and 
therefore in effect relate causally toward them,  it must therefore be external to them. As 
such, by Mumford’s lights, if one is to adopt this conceit, one ultimately admits an 
irresolvable dilemma into one’s metaphysics insofar as, if one is to accept the externality of 
the laws of nature, and thus establish the further dependence of powers upon additional 
forces, one therefore opens one’s metaphysics to the admission of quiddities , the 
consequence of which being the denial of true fundamentality to dispositional properties. 
(Mumford, 2004) Furthermore, Mumford argues that the very central commitments of the 
dispositional essentialist picture of fundamental properties ultimately exhausts the role 
which the laws of nature would otherwise be expected to play in accounting for the 
structure of nature. Namely, if one is to adopt the thesis that nature’s fundamental 
properties are ultimately defined by their being disposed with certain powers to effect 
certain manifestations when entering into certain causal relations, any role which the laws 
of nature might play in one’s ontology is thus effectively usurped by dispositions given that 
the explanatory powers of the laws of nature in terms of accounting for structural 
connections in nature are equally well accounted for by the dispositional essences of 
fundamental properties and the relations obtaining therefrom. As such, Mumford 
maintains that, if acceding to the account of dispositions as being exhausted by the causal 
powers they bestow with this therefore accounting for the regularities within nature which 
natural laws would otherwise be tasked with encompassing, the inclusion of the laws of 
nature within a dispositional essentialist ontology is therefore both moot and furthermore 
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ultimately incongruent with the anti-Humean, dispositional essentialist program. 
(Mumford, 2004) 
 In light of the peculiar tenets of Mumford’s conception of dispositional essentialism, 
the lawless dispositional essentialist conceit must be demonstrated to hold congruently 
against the falsifiable presentation of natural phenomena, or more specifically, Mumford’s 
thesis as to the extraneousness of the laws of nature in accounting for nature’s fundamental 
structure must bear-up against the synoptic requirements of accounting for the in re 
presentation of natural phenomena. To this end, as to the core stipulation of the ultimate 
incompatibility of natural laws and the anti-Humean, dispositional monist program, we 
must first be capable of establishing as satisfactory the conception of dispositional essences 
as being exhausted in their conferral of causal powers upon their respective properties. As 
such, in order that Mumford’s anti-nomic thesis be maintained, when taking under 
consideration the manifestation of a given property, the underlying mechanisms which 
produce its manifestation as such must be capable of being accounted for expressly by the 
specific power which they’re disposed to exhibit to the exclusion of any reliance upon any 
further putative form of relational property or necessary connection. More specifically, the 
manifestation of such properties as the redness of a flash of grease igniting in a cooking pan 
would thus need to be fully accounted for strictly along the lines of the specific  disposition 
toward the presentation of redness by the flash as structurally entailed by the specific 
powers of the substances at play without any reliance upon antecedent external 
dependence relations of any kind. 
To wit, Mumford’s accession to a picture of nature wherein its fundamental 
structure is identical to the principles and forces which accord with those ultimately 
exhausted by causation, and thus to the exclusion of any form of higher-order ordering 
relations and forces,  stands as perhaps the most critical pitfall faced by Mumford’s 
program. Among the key sources of this synoptic tension is to be found in the nascent 
though ever expanding literature engaging with the macroscopic properties of systems, and 
more specifically, how best to account for the dependency relationship of the properties of 
the macroscopic relative to those of a respective system’s composing constituents.  To this 
end, the difficulty posed in certain cases of establishing a strictly linear relationship 
between the macroscopic processes and rudimentary composing constituents of certain 
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systems constitutes the core of the challenge faced by such physically reductive approaches 
as Mumford’s. To this end, such a conceit, it might be well inferred, should be taken as 
highly suspect as the mere discreteness of any given power in no way implies its 
independence from a broader structural chain, or for that matter, whether or not the power 
is itself merely a subsidiary facet of a macroscopic, systematic process, even if such a fact 
were to run counter to our intuitive perceptions. (Gillett, 2016) More specifically, holding 
this claim to apply to any apparently discrete property  presupposes that in fact the prima 
facea appearance of discreteness is just that, such that is neglected the possibility of any 
given effect being  but the appreciation of one facet of what is in fact a more complex, 
systematically disposed power. (Gillett, 2016) 
 A principal example of such cases can be found in the study of population-level 
adaptive fitness characteristics, prime among these being the eusocial fitness 
characteristics of ant colonies as studied by the likes of E.O. Wilson. The primary challenge 
for Mumford’s thesis in light of such cases concerns how exactly the proper relationship of 
the various discrete properties appertaining to the fitness characteristics of ant colonies 
can be accounted for given that the behavioral inventory of the colony relates in a 
fundamentally non-linear, macroscopic fashion to the functional attributes of its 
constituent particles, i.e. the individual ants themselves. Specifically, while the behavior of 
each individual member of a given colony is is observable simply as the individual behavior 
a given single agent, the eusocial fitness characteristics which dispose attendant behavioral 
presentation obtain such they form part of a broader, regular pattern which occurs as a 
consequence of the dynamics of the colony as a macroscopic system.(Wilson, 1988) More 
specifically, in instances of the collective problem solving capacities of ant colonies, the 
clear evidence of collective, self-organizing behavior thus requires accounts which admit of 
antecedent complex governing mechanisms permitting of the functional interconnections 
prompting the behavioral output, and thus the attendant determining relations by virtue of 
which they are underpinned. As such, the functioning of such systems in even the barest of 
putative senses necessitates accounts which admit of structural dependencies among its 
various constituent particles given that in the absence of which any description of their 
behavior would be wholly incoherent. (Wilson, 1988) Taking this as the case, when 
engaging with phenomena the structure of which cannot be accounted for without taking 
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for granted the existence of determining dependence relations holding antecedently 
between otherwise apparently discrete entities, the role of such law-like determining 
dependence relations and the nomological dynamics appertaining thereto, are thus 
indispensable in providing synoptic accounts of nature’s ontological foundation. 
 
Nomic Necessitarianism and Causal Fundamentality 
While themselves positing differing essential relationships between dispositions 
and the laws of nature, the dominant general orientation within the dispositional 
essentialist program admits broadly of the fundamental role of the causal profile of 
properties in filling-out their dispositional dispositional characters. Perhaps the principal 
distinction at play in the specific role which dispositional essentialists ascribe to the laws of 
nature concerns the determining relationship such as it might be between dispositions and 
LON, or more specifically, whether it must be held that the the laws of nature are necessary 
in providing for the ground of dispositions or whether in fact dispositions themselves 
provide the essential ground of the laws of nature, which in turn derive their synoptic 
necessity in providing for the structure of nature in the from of relations obtaining between 
the manifestations of different dispositions. In the case of the latter conceit, Alexander 
Bird’s nomic necessitarian dispositional monist framework provides among the more 
authoritative accounts which admit of the necessity of the laws of nature, providing a 
reasonable base from which the essential dynamics of a monistically dispositional account 
of fundamental properties and the laws of nature, such as they might exist, might be 
accounted for. By the lights of Bird, the laws of nature are to be properly derived from the  
foundation provided by the powers with which a given a fundamental property is endowed, 
with the laws of nature themselves amounting to both being identical with the powers with 
which any given property is endowed as well as in less fundamental cases, the relations 
which obtain necessarily between fundamental properties. (Bird, 2007) More specifically, 
the laws of nature, by Bird’s account, are to be taken as flowing from the causal profile of 
the potencies which fix the identity of a given property, with the laws of nature in turn 
being reflective of the dispositional essences of fundamental properties and the relations in 
which they obtain in virtue of. To this end,  Bird holds dispositions to obtain as powers 
which are in turn given to produce a certain output when entering into particular causal 
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relationships with other properties, with any property manifestation thus obtaining 
essentially as a consequence of casual relations. Furthermore, Bird holds fundamental 
properties, and thus in addition all higher order properties, to be ultimately physically 
compatible, with all property manifestations being determined by microphysical states of 
affairs. As such, in the most fundamental sense, the conception of the nomological 
subsistence of properties advanced by Bird takes as its base a picture of the world whereby 
nature’s ultimate foundation is to be found in the worldview afforded by physicalism, with 
the most fundamental properties of nature in turn being those which are illuminated by 
physical phenomena, with all other properties and relations thus obtaining secondarily 
thereto and with the laws of nature themselves being identical with the causal profile of a 
given power corresponding to a given physically-grounded property.  (Bird, 2007) 
In the case of Bird’s particular framework, in accounting for the subsistence of 
dispositions, and in order for Bird’s picture of the ground of dispositions to hold, the 
elemental subsistence of properties and their attendant laws of nature as ascribed by Bird 
must then be compatible with the essential dynamics observed in the behavioral 
presentation of special science entities, with the profile corresponding to those properties 
considered by Bird as fundamental thus requiring a direct analogue in the constitution of 
nature’s fundamental forces. To this end, in Bird’s stipulation as to the profile of 
fundamental properties being exhausted by the causal potencies which they comprise, the 
picture of nature which we are afforded by the special sciences must then in turn indicate 
nature’s fundamental forces as being essentially causal, and furthermore physically 
acceptable, in their structure. To wit, Bird’s accession to a picture of the world wherein its 
fundamental structure is identical to the principles and forces which accord with those 
exhausted by ultimately physical states of affairs would require then that the full run of 
properties at all levels, and the nomological forces appertaining thereto, be ultimately 
decomposable into causally-grounded properties and forces. As such, in the case of 
macroscopic properties, or properties which obtain in virtue of the higher-order functions 
of a given system, the properties appertaining to the higher-order functions, as opposed to 
those of the more rudimentary constituent components of the system, as in for instance the 
behavioral inventory of a given species, must therefore be capable of being mapped-onto 
the same property base which accounts for the strictly physical properties of the individual 
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particles. For instance, in the case of the previously cited eusocial fitness characteristics of 
ant colonies, the complex problem solving capacities and the communicative facility which 
underlies it must be derivable from the physically acceptable physiological, communicative, 
and otherwise behavioral capacities with which individual ants are endowed. More 
specifically, in order that Bird’s thesis as to the fundamentally physical foundation of 
reality’s structure be upheld when considering such examples as the above, the same 
physically acceptable essential underlying mechanisms and dependence relations which 
underpin the rudimentary mechanistic properties of the particles’ functional inventory 
must be demonstrated as being capable of accounting equally well for the more complex 
macroscopic properties and dependence relations corresponding to the ant colonies’ 
eusocial fitness characteristics. 
While advancing a view which certainly provides a consummate counterargument 
to both critiques of the viability of dispositions in accounting for the ground of properties 
and the role and necessity of the laws of nature appertaining thereto, the picture of 
dispositional essentialism defended by Bird does nonetheless present with a number of 
loose ends which, if a disposition monist conception of fundamental properties is to be 
maintained, must addressed and remedied in kind. Specifically, Bird’s view encounters a 
number of pitfalls when engaging with certain facts of nature relevant to the viability of a 
picture of relations wherein the profile of potencies are exhausted but their causal roles. To 
this end, growing appreciation of the limitations of strictly causal relations in accounting 
for nature’s essential mechanisms thus constitutes perhaps the key inadequacy of Bird’s 
picture of the ground of fundamental properties. Most particularly, cases concerning the 
relationship of the properties attendant to the constituent particles of a system to those 
properties which obtain at the macroscopic level of the system present among the most 
fundamental challenges to conceptions of property identity as being fixed by its strictly 
causal profile. To wit, instances of non-linear emergence  encompassed by work the like of 
theoretical physicist Robert Laughlin on symmetry breaking in complex particle collectives 
appears to indicate the irreducibility of the macroscopic properties obtaining when 
entering into complex aggregations, such as in crystal formation, wherein the determining 
relations at play confer “preferred positions” upon the crystal’s constituent particles. 
(Laughlin, 2005) More specifically, as demonstrated by the behavior of complex particle 
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aggregations, the determining relations which obtain between the constituent particles of 
such aggregations cannot be accounted for by elementary stimulus / reaction dynamics 
between the individual particles  and their environment. This can be taken as the case 
given that the downward influence effected by the macroscopic determining relations of 
complex aggregations thus precludes the invocation of strictly causal relations in 
determining the behaviors of a complex aggregation’s constituent particles insofar as these 
determining relations obtain in a synchronous, discontinuous fashion to the systems’s 
constituents, with these relations thus evidencing potencies which exact a formative 
influence upon the system’s constituent particles that in turn cannot be modeled by 
rudimentary stimulus / reaction dynamics. Thus, as demonstrated by such cases as this, 
explanatory priority must be given not to the causal profile of each property ascribable 
respectively to a given stimulus and its output, but rather to the broader systematic role it 
fulfills in the wider manifold of nature’s macroscopically conditioned processes such that 
the identity of a given property is to be found in the macroscopically-oriented nomolgical 
foundation which underpins its presentation as such. 
 
The Machretic Nomological Picture 
In view of the inadequacies endemic to the various flavors of dispositonal  
monism examined prior with respect to both the structure and ground of the identity of 
fundamental properties, and most particularly concerning the relationship of fundamental 
properties to physically compatible conceptions of the laws of nature, the challenge then 
remaining is to identify a viable alternative which meets the synoptic aims and attendant 
essential theoretic commitments intended by dispositional monism, but which is also in 
keeping with the necessities of accounting for nature’s complex macroscopic processes. To 
this end, given the principal challenges faced by the more traditional varieties of 
dispositional monism arise most acutely from their failure to adequately account for the 
more complex, macroscopic properties and relations which present in higher-order natural 
phenomena, any further attempts to reconcile the essential tenets of dispositional monism 
with our falsifiable appreciation of nature’s structure must then be attuned to the 
nomological consequences of incorporating non-linearly emergent macroscopic processes 
into such an account of fundamental properties. More specifically, as examined respectively 
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in the standard-bearing cases of Stephen Mumford’s nomological anti-realist and Alexander 
Bird’s fundamentally physical conceptions of dispositional essentialism, the theoretical 
inadequacies endemic respectively to each, deriving principally in both instances from a 
reliance upon a conception of fundamental properties which takes as their base the 
fundamentality and completeness of physics, positions each of these flavors of dispositional 
monism as incapable of accounting for the putatively strongly metaphysically emergent 
non-linear properties of macroscopic processes. To this end, in making any attempt to 
satisfactorily account for macroscopic processes within a dispositionally monistic 
framework, in order to suitably provide for the synoptic requirements entailed in 
considering the consequences of complex macroscopic systems, an appropriate account of 
the laws of nature from which the nomological footing of a dispositional essentialist 
conception of fundamental properties can be established must then be derived, an account 
which is capable of making sense of the putatively non-causal, strongly metaphysically 
emergent fundamental ordering relations at play therein. 
When taking under consideration the non-linear, strongly metaphysically emergent 
nature of certain macroscopic processes in establishing the ground of dispositional 
monism, and concerning particularly the nascency of this line of reasoning, any alternative 
which might be developed or adopted in service of this aim will of course be comparatively 
rough-hewn and tentative in its footing. This said, possibly the most suitable candidate 
readily on the market at present, namely the concept of machretic determination, has been 
developed within various domains of the higher-level special sciences precisely with the 
aim of  accounting for the putatively non-linear relation of strongly metaphysically 
emergent macroscopic properties to the strictly physical properties of their constituent 
particles. The concept of machretic determination most essentially posits macroscopic 
properties to downwardly relate to the constituent particles of their respective system by 
way of non-causal, non-compositional role-shaping functions through which  the behavior 
of their constituent particles is conditioned. (Gillett, 2016) More specifically, by the lights of 
machretic conditioning, the macroscopic properties of a given system possess a form of 
functionality over and above what any composite relation of the endowed powers of the 
constituent particles could linearly produce, additively or otherwise, with this therefore 
evidencing forces exceeding those appertaining strictly to a system’s composing 
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constituents. Most essentially, the core tenets of the machretically conditioned nomological 
picture posit the fundamental subsistence of non-linearly emergent macroscopic 
properties to obtain as a consequence of conditioned, non-compositional aggregation. By 
the lights of the machretic condioning thesis, those properties which obtain at the 
macroscopic level of a system are held to emerge as a consequence of the introduction of 
novel, non-physically acceptable, nomic forces, nomic forces which are introduced when 
the constituent particles of a system enter into aggregate relations, relations which obtain 
discontinously with respect to those obtaining at smaller-scale sub-cohorts of the same 
constituent particles. (Gillett, 2016)  To this end, the particular form of relations which 
present in relevant cases of macroscopic, conditioned aggregation do so in a fashion which 
precludes their inclusion within frameworks which permit of continuous, linearly derived 
gradations of levels within a system such that the properties appertaining to the higher-
level functions of a system could be accounted for as merely additive features of the 
aggregate interactions of  a system’s individual rudimentary constituent particles  (Gillette, 
2016) As such, the additional potencies which are imparted to the functional inventory of 
particle collective systems in virtue of  entering into machretically conditioned relations 
which obtain such that these powers are ultimately begotten in virtue of non-productive, 
non-causal, role shaping determining relations, determining relations which are 
themselves wholly interdependent and mutually realized at their root. As such, in adopting 
a machretic picture of the laws of nature writ large, and thus not only concerning specific, 
limited systems within nature, the laws of nature would be held as identical with the 
macroscopic conditioning determining relations, determining relations from which the 
structure of nature and its respective constituent systems would be understood as most 
fundamentally deriving their functional characteristics. (Gillette, 2016) 
When considered with respect to its further consequences for articulating the 
nomological ground of dispositonal essentialist frameworks in accounting for fundamental 
properties,  the foundations of the dispositional monist program must be revisited in terms 
of both their relationship to the laws of nature and the role of strictly physical properties 
(i.e. causation, etc,) therein. More specifically, in contrast to the substance of such debates 
as those which have taken place between the likes of Alexander Bird and Stephen Mumford 
regarding the ontological status of the laws of nature, debates which have turned primary 
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on such matters as the externality vs. internality and the corresponding governing role of 
the laws of nature exerted over properties, when expanded to encompass the nomological 
ground of fundamental, essentially dispositional properties, a machretic picture of the laws 
of nature would entail rather questions regarding how exactly to account for the structure, 
individuation, and subsidiary determining relations of fundamental properties relative to 
their subsistence within an essentially macroscopic, mutually-determinative whole. (Bird, 
2007)  To this end, questions regarding the externality vs. internality and governing role of 
the laws of nature would be circumvented entirely insofar as the laws of nature would 
comprise simply the systemic, structurally interdependent, mutually determinative 
conditioning relations both obtaining between systems of composing constituents, and the 
attendant properties thereof as well as being essential to the structure of the properties 
themselves.  
 The core of machretic determination’s implications as stated prior correspond to 
the ultimately fundamentally mutualist picture of nature’s structure it puts forth, a 
conception of natural order which contrasts sharply with the reductive impetuses 
animating the essential conceits of frameworks which both assume and advocate the 
completeness and fundamentality of physics. More specifically, as highlighted in the 
attendant critiques of both the broad iterations which they represent and particular 
commitments of Stephen Mumford and Alexander Bird’s  varieties of dispositional 
essentialism, the orthodox reliance of dispositional essentialist frameworks upon grounds 
admitting of the fundamentality and completeness of physics is both rendered untenable 
when acceding to  the basic, emergentist synoptic impetus of machretic determination, and 
in equal measure, the primary aims and persistent theoretical tensions of dispositional 
essentialism might well find their resolution in adopting the essential tenets of the 
machretic conditioning. To this end, the incorporation of machretic conditioning into 
dispositional essentialist frameworks would necessarily entail developing an account of the 
nomological ground of fundamental properties, and most importantly the relationship of 
fundamental properties thereto, which takes as its base an essentially macroscopic, 
mutually determined subsistence of fundamental properties.  More specifically, a 
machretically-informed dispositional essentialist framework would necessarily operate 
from an assumption of the mutual determination of properties, and attendantly the 
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subsistence of fundamental properties within the greater whole of machretically 
determined systems, and furthermore the machretically determined structure of nature as 
a whole. This being the case, the task next to be fulfilled is to develop and articulate 
rudimentary, preliminary assumptions which would be adopted in advancing a 
monistically dispositional program which is compatible with the essential tenets of 
machretic determination, a ground which putatively accounts for the essential structure 
and relational mode of manifestation of a monistically dispositional conception of 
properties while admitting of the inadequacy of causal frames of analysis in satisfying this 
end.  As such, the remainder of this paper will be devoted to articulating a preliminary, 
tentative outline of the fundamental assumption which might provide for a machretically 
grounded, monistically dispositional framework, a framework which will both allow for the 
continuation of the dispositional monist program in light of complex macroscopic 
phenomena, as well as, I would submit, point toward the means by which the promise of 
dispositonal monism might be more fully realized. 
 
The Structure of Machretically Grounded Dispositions 
Given the peculiarities of the machretic conception of the laws of nature, not least 
concerning the primacy it accords to macroscopic properties and relations, developing fully 
a systematic, dispositionally monistic account of fundamental properties requires the 
unpacking of the implications of adopting macroscopic nomological fundamentality in 
deriving the specific shape which the corresponding structure of properties might take.  
More specifically, in virtue of the particular caveats imparted to questions concerning the 
ground of dispositions when upholding a machretically nomological constitution of 
nature’s structure, caveats which turn on the full-stop mutual interdependence of any and 
all properties, any account which can be given of the rudimentary structure of properties 
must therefore accord with the subsistence of all properties being rooted within a mutually 
realized, essentially wholistic structural ground. As such, when taking on board the 
essential tenets of the machretic picture of the laws of nature, the core stipulation of the 
non-causal, role-shaping essence of the laws of nature would require that the any account 
of properties  adopt the foundational ground of properties as being at base supra-causal 
and furthermore essentially dependent upon the mutually-realized whole of nature’s 
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structure. (Gillete, 2016) Taking this as being the case, and given the structural mutualism 
required of a machretic picture of natural properties, the identity of said properties must 
be held as essentially congruent with the non-compostional, non-productive, non-causal 
determining relations which form the central tenets of the machretic conception 
nomological structure. To this end, both as a matter of programmatic intent and as natural 
consequence of acceding to the core tenets of machretic conditioning, the traditional 
synoptic reliance upon cleanly reductive descriptions of the foundational interrelations of 
nature’s structure becomes untenable. Consequently, in acknowledging the inadequacy of 
physicalist reductionism in satisfactorily meeting the synoptic requirements of providing 
for nature’s fundamental structure, the adaptation in turn of our descriptions of nature’s 
processes such that they are capable of providing for a much more complex, mutually 
interdependent, systems-level oriented picture of the ground of nature’s fundamental 
properties  is therefore required.  
In view of the putative structure of fundamental properties as congruent with the 
machretic conception of the laws of nature, as a consequence of the tenets of this picture,  
the adapting of dispositional monism to reflect these commitments requires a fundamental 
rethinking of not only the manner in which  the identity of property finds its ground, but 
also the form of relations by way of which  fundamental properties relate to both nature’s 
nomological structure as well as among  themselves. This being the case, the structural 
interdependence which forms the central tenet of the machretic picture of the laws of 
nature precludes any deference towards the specific essence itself of a given manifested 
property as providing in any sense the exhaustive ground of said property. (Gillete, 2016) 
As such, any discrete property manifestation would be taken then not as the expression in 
re of a specific, intrinsically-grounded disposition toward a particular manifestation on the 
part of the singularly disposed causal efficacy possessed by a given property, but rather the 
mutually-realized expression of a broader systemic natural necessity, with any manifested 
property being taken as a necessary component in maintaining the whole, machretically 
constituted system’s structural integrity such that the structure of the system in its entirety 
would be incoherent in in its absence. For example, in describing such cases as the 
manifestation of the property of mass, the property of mass would be held as manifesting 
as such as a consequence of the suite of factors by virtue of which the attribute of mass is 
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possessed, i.e. the laws of classical mechanics, the special theory of relativity, the 
elementary geometric delimitations of Minkowski space, etc., by virtue of which any given 
object is imparted mass such that it would be dubious to consider the property of mass as it 
expressed within our immediate, sense-perceptible universe absent those structural 
elements which provide the ground of its possibility.  Therefore, with this requisite 
structural mutualism being taken as the case, the natural necessities by virtue of which 
properties derive their manifestation would be held as necessary entailments which are 
part and parcel of of nature’s machretically determined, fundamentally macroscopic 
structure, with these natural necessities in turn being identical with the manifesting 
relations by virtue of which a given property is expressed in re. 
In observing the previously stated theoretical commitments, specifically, in holding 
fundamental properties to derive their realization in virtue of relations which correspond 
with natural necessities which in turn are coextensive with machretic role-shaping  
determining relations, the manner in which fundamental properties are to be accounted for 
with respect to their manifestation in the world differs substantially from both other 
iterations of dispositional monism  as well as all other conceptions of fundamental 
properties stemming from the commitments of the fundamentality and completeness of 
physics.  Further to this, given that fundamental properties obtain in virtue of natural 
necessities in the form of machretic role-shaping determining relations, the manifestation 
of nature’s fundamental properties must therefore find their subsistence in strictly non-
productive, non-compositional, mutually interdependent determining relations 
characteristic of machretic conditioning, with these natural necessities being in turn 
responsible for the manifestation of properties. Thus, contra the standard modeling of 
dispositions as causally efficacious powers in the going discourse on dispositions, as a 
consequence of the commitments of machretic nomological structuralism, the picture of 
the natural necessities corresponding to the relations in virtue of which properties derive 
their manifestation must then be established as operating in the absence of frameworks 
reliant upon externally effective manifesting stimulus relations.  
In contrast to conceptions of dispositional monism which hold intrinsically 
grounded properties to derive their manifestation by virtue of entering into external, 
causally efficacious relations which trigger a given manifestation in a particular set of 
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circumstances, a machretically grounded conception of dispositions would hold the the 
relations in virtue of which the manifestation of properties obtain to constitute facets of a 
particular  machretic structural niche, with manifested properties being thus disposed 
toward its manifestation from the particular systemic role it fulfills, with these natural 
necessities being in turn entailed by the full remit of a system’s machretically determined 
structure. As such, the dispositions of any given set of entities to produce a given effect 
within particular contexts would be properly described as manifestations of  a single 
disposition in the form of the natural necessity manifest there-between. More specifically, 
the identity of a given property would thus be synonymous with components of natural 
necessities which are themselves identical with functional niches of machretic role-shaping 
processes, or more specifically, rather than a given property being conceived of as finding 
its ground in the profile of its causal efficaciousness, properties would be held as 
coterminous, and thus identical, with natural necessities as structurally entailed by the 
broader  machretic nomological foundation of nature’s structure. 
In sum, having developed a preliminary sketch of the fundamental assumptions 
underlying the structure which a machretically grounded dispositionally monistic 
framework might take, as a latent consequence of this enterprise, the implications of such a 
framework in terms of synoptically structuring our understanding of natural phenomena 
should hopefully have been made apparent. Specifically, in taking the identity of properties 
to be exhausted by natural necessities corresponding to the functional substrates, or 
niches, of nature’s machretically grounded structure, the principal notions underlying this 
framework both stand in stark contrast to most traditional approaches to framing nature’s 
fundamental ordering relations as well as complement more recent developments in this 
arena with respect to our growing appreciation of the full complexity of nature’s structure. 
Specifically, in taking fundamental properties as being disposed in virtue of the functional 
substrates, or niches, of nature’s fundamentally macroscopic, machretically determined  
structure in total, the hitherto largely dominant narrative of properties as finding their 
ground and descriptive force within the mechanical processes attendant to strictly physical 
forces thus become untenable. To this end, in further developing a picture of the principal 
assumptions attendant to a machretically grounded monistically dispositional framework, 
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the manner in which such a framework would synoptically engage with nature’s processes 
as they actually behave in the world  of course begs exploration in its own right. 
 
The Manifestation of Machretically Grounded Dispositions 
Having taken a view as to how best the core structure of a machretically grounded 
picture of dispositions might be construed, in order to provide fully for a satisfactory 
sketch of a machretically dispositional framework, the particular shape of the manner in 
which means the potencies imparted by dispositions might come to be manifested in the 
world thus requires spelling-out in its own right.  To this end, in order provide a picture of 
the expression of machretically determined properties in re, the commitment of a 
machretically compatible dispositional monism to the ground and identity of dispositions 
as being exhausted by the machretically determined structural substrates, or niches, of 
machretic systems, would require any account of the expression of  properties attendant to 
the behavioral presentation of natural phenomena to hold these phenomena  as extending 
in virtue of natural necessities in the form of the structural niche of a given machretic 
system with which the property is coextensive. As such, when describing the behavioral 
presentation of a system, its description as such would necessarily operate from a 
background which encompasses the corresponding property’s mutually determined 
structural dependence relations, with these dependence relations being exhausted by the 
natural necessities which in turn obtain in virtue of the structural requirements of the 
system writ large. (Gillette, 2016) More specifically, the behavior of a given system must be 
considered then as presenting as a consequence of the emergence of the various respective 
structural entailments obtaining in a given set of circumstances in virtue of the mutually 
determinative structure of nature’s nomological constitution, with the behavioral outputs 
thereof being taken as inextricably bound up in the structural necessities of the system as a 
whole. As such, in demonstrating the viability of this program, the commitments a 
machretically grounded, monistically dispositional framework in terms of the full-stop 
systemic mutual dependence of all fundamental properties must therefore be 
demonstrated as synoptically attuned, and therefore congruent, with the properties of 
natural phenomena as they present in the world. 
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In terms of identifying specific cases which suitably illustrate in concrete fashion the 
central conceits of a machretically compatible dispositionally monistic framework, and 
while the core impetus for the framework has arisen from the higher order sciences, taking 
as an example a phenomenon properly the province at the more rudimentary strictly 
physical sciences  would thus provide a broader picture of the applicability of a 
machretically grounded dispositional essentialist framework. To this end, the propensity of 
certain elements toward radioactive decay provides an ideally illustrative case in this 
regard, given that, while appertaining to more rudimentary, physically acceptable 
phenomena, being a stochastic phenomenon, it nonetheless defies the traditional reliance 
of physicallist-oriented synoptic frameworks upon the causal efficaciousness of properties 
insofar as its manifestation is triggered in the absence of any form of directly causal 
relation. (Coughlan, 2006) In addition, radioactive decay is structurally situated within 
nature in such a way that it provides an ideal example of the kind of structurally mutual 
interdependencies obtaining at multiple levels of natural structure posited by machretic 
conditioning. To this end, in applying a machretically dispositional essentialist framework 
to spontaneous radioactive decay, the dispositon of certain elements toward falling into 
radioactive decay would be held as obtaining as a manifestation toward the natural 
necessity corresponding with its essential function within the structure of nature’s 
machretically determined nomogolical constitution. More specifically, the dispostion of a 
given element to enter into a state of radioactive decay would be described such that its 
propensity to do so constitutes a component of a necessary functional niche within the 
machretically determined structure of nature such that nomological structural integrity of  
nature on the whole is predicated in part upon the existence of radioactive decay. More 
specifically, by the lights of this framework, the property of being disposed to radioactive 
decay is essential to the manifestation of other properties which are in turn equally vital for 
the functioning of natural processes writ large,  spanning every level natural phenomena.  
For example, in the absence of the disposition toward radioactive decay, and perhaps first 
and foremost, given radioactive decay’s position as part of the broader process of particle 
decay, the vital natural functions permitting of the diffusion of energy would thus be 
impossible insofar as the very mechanism which permits for the diffusion of energy 
necessarily entails radioactive decay by extension of its structural constitution. (Coughlan, 
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2006) In turn, in the absence of the process of energy diffusion, and in addition to its role in 
facilitating other strictly physical processes, the functioning of virtually all higher-order 
natural phenomena would be impossible in its absence given the vital role of energy in the 
functioning of virtually all processes in nature.  As such, by the lights of a machretically 
grounded monistically dispositional framework, the propensity toward radioactive decay 
would constitute a natural necessity corresponding to the machretic niche of the 
elementary process of energy diffusion with this niche in turn being mutually determined 
by the structural requirements of nature’s machretic constitution writ large 
 In addition to the vital role of radioactive decay in strictly physical functions, it 
possesses also enormous significance in predicating the structure of macroscopic, as well a 
more generally higher-order, phenomena, with its role as such serving to further 
demonstrate the plausible machretic mutual interdependencies which ground nature’s 
structure at every level of complexity. Specifically, in the instance of  the rudimentary life 
functions of living organisms, the very mechanical basis of these functions, namely the 
process of metabolization, is itself a complex mode of energy transference and 
transformation whereby the essential energy needed to sustain organisms is transferred 
from food sources in the external environment into the internal life processes of a given 
organism. (Becker, 2001) Further in this vein, in broadening the frame to encompass 
macroscopic life processes, revisiting the example used prior, in the case of the eusocial 
fitness characteristic of ant colonies, while the rudimentary life functions of a colonies’ 
constituent particles, i.e, the ants themselves, are dependent upon the process of energy 
metabolization, the systems-level eusocial fitness characteristics evidenced by the behavior 
of the colony as a whole are nonetheless wholly in-deducible from the rudimentary 
function of energy metabolization given that they exhibit properties which cannot be in any 
fashion linearly mapped-onto the physically grounded capacities of  the constituent 
particles.  (Wilson, 1988) This being the case, the relations appertaining to the functional 
dynamics between the various levels of functionality in colony-systems as a whole, within 
which the structural niche which radioactive decay forms a component fulfilling an 
upwardly compositional role, we can see the natural necessities which, by the lights of a 
machretically grounded dispositionalism, subsume the structure of nature, with, at both 
the most rudimentary as well as macroscopic level, the manifestation of a given property 
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appertaining to a given one system being intimately and essentially dependent upon the 
nomological constitution of nature’s structure in its entirety.  
 In sum, having taken as a base the proposed machretically compatible adaptation of 
dispositional monism, and having thus accordingly attempted to sketch a tentative picture 
of the application of this framework with respect to accounting for the manifestation of 
properties in re, the core implications and promise of the commitments of machretic 
conditonioning in terms of providing a synoptic lens through which the relational dynamics 
of macroscopic processes and their respective rudimentary, subsidiary  constituent 
particles has thus hopefully been further illustrated. Specifically, in examining such cases as 
the disposition of certain substances toward radioactive decay, the efficacy of a 
machretically-grounded dispositional essentialist framework in resolving the tensions 
manifest in attempting to account for the dynamics of complex, non-causal processes and 
their attendant properties with the toolkit afforded by the ontological commitments of 
physicalism. In this regard, when encompassed within a machretically informed 
dispositional essentialist framework, the challenges presented in attempting to establish 
the ground of the disposition of the putatively non-causal manifestation of radioactive 
decay  are ameliorated insofar as, rather than accounting for the presentation of the 
phenomenon as such by way of frameworks trading in strictly cause and effect dynamics, 
the manifestation of radio active decay would be seen as manifesting in virtue of its 
necessary entailment as a facet of the broader structural niche of energy of transformation 
in the structure of nature on the whole. Furthermore, the relationship of the structural 
niche of which the property toward radioactive decay is part and parcel, when framed 
explicitly in terms of machreiotic condioning, constitutes a necessary predicate of higher-
order phenomena such that, while the properties which these processes instantiate are 
emergently ontologically autonomous from those appertaining to radioactive decay, 
radioactive decay is nonetheless indispensable in accounting for the full range of their 
functionality. As such, the complex phenomena of radioactive decay would obtain in virtue 
of its forming a necessary component of the broader structural necessities essential to the 
integrity of the constitution of our actually existing world. Thus, as illustrated by such 
cases, the application of a machretically grounded dispositional essentialist framework 
both provides a plausible, falsifiable ground for dispositional monism as well as a means 
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In the course of this paper, I hope to have satisfied the task of setting the 
preliminary course for a synoptic groundwork capable of making sense of the range and 
extent of nature’s structural complexity. I have sought to fulfill this aim by way of 
articulating the principle initial architecture of a theoretical framework which takes as its 
base a conception of the laws of nature and natural properties which accommodates the 
complexity of macroscopic systems and the relations which obtain downwardly therefrom. 
More specifically, in articulating the principal assumptions which would underpin such a 
framework, the apparent difficulty presented in accounting for nature’s structure in light of 
the putative unsuitability of a fundamental physics in fully encompassing macroscopic 
processes forms the principal impetus of developing a synoptic framework which account 
for fundamentality without the aid of a reductive physicalist base. To wit, this objective 
follows on acknowledging the necessity of developing a fulsome understanding of the 
dynamics of the complex interrelationship of nature’s composting constituents, and the 
properties which they instantiate, requires an at least practical recognition of the utility of 
developing frameworks which accede to a picture of nature’s structure as functioning, at 
least in the case of certain macroscopic processes, at the level of the whole system, and thus 
counter to the standard physicalist conceit as to the completeness of phyiscs and thus the 
accompanying reducibility of macroscopic properties thereto. 
In view of this end,  the principal focus of developing such a conception of 
dispositional monism has been to articulate a preliminary groundwork for frameworks 
capable of serving as a baseline alternative to a fundamental physics, a framework which 
provides a foundation for synoptic accounts of nature’s structure compatible with our ever 
greater appreciation of the enormity and scale of nature’s complexity. In short, this outlook 
considers fundamental properties to be the expression of  natural necessities 
corresponding to the structurally entailed, mutually realized attributes within nature such 
that when we speak, for instance, of the disposition of cottonwood toward low 
flammability, we speak of the essential entailments of its ecological niche vis-à-vis the 
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particular biome of which it forms a part, with this attribute furthermore reflecting the 
essential chemical and physical structural dynamics upon which the whole of the biosphere 
is dependent. Accordingly, this conception of fundamental properties endeavors to provide 
a synoptically unifying account in fidelity with the various facts of the world afforded by 
our inquiry into its fundamental structure, a picture which points ever more definitively 
toward the primacy of the macroscopic, irreducible complexity in the fundamental 
ordering of the world. As such, the primary impetus animating the development of the 
machretically grounded monistically dispositional approach flows from a desire to steer 
metaphysics in a direction in closer fidelity with the aforementioned evidence indicating 
ever more convincingly an emerging picture of the world relative to which the the 
reductionistic  conceits of physicalism are to my mind, in any case, synoptically inadequate. 
Furthermore, in the preliminary development of this program, I hope to have by extension 
demonstrated the potentially indispensable role of metaphysics in resolving problems 
concerning the fundamental structure of nature such that new territory might be cleared in 
which fruitful lines of inquiry might be pursued both in advancing the discourse within 
metaphysics itself as well as, by extension, ultimately positioning research in metaphysics 
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